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The	delayed	publication	of	the	Russia	Report
demonstrates	why	reform	is	needed	to	preserve	the
Intelligence	and	Security	Committee’s	independence
Events	surrounding	the	publication	of	the	Russia	Report	reveal	as	much	about	the	poor	state	of
the	government’s	relations	with	Parliament’s	Intelligence	and	Security	Committee	(ISC)	as	those
with	Russia,	writes	Andrew	Defty.	He	sets	out	an	agenda	for	reform	to	restore	the
independence	of	the	ISC	and	put	relations	between	the	government	and	the	ISC	on	a	more
constructive	footing.
At	the	end	of	the	21	July	press	conference	to	launch	the	Intelligence	and	Security	Committee’s
long-delayed	Russia	Report,	the	new	ISC	Chair,	Julian	Lewis,	observed	that	“the	sooner	normal	relations	are
restored	between	this	committee	and	the	government	the	better	it	will	be	for	all	concerned.”	His	follow-up	comment,
that	the	committee	had	not	been	informed	about	the	government’s	written	response	to	the	report	which	was
released	to	Parliament	at	the	same	time,	suggests	there	is	still	some	way	to	go.
Relations	between	the	government	and	the	Intelligence	and	Security	Committee	are	in	a	parlous	state.	The	seven-
month	delay	in	nominating	members	of	a	new	committee	following	December’s	general	election,	along	with	the
debacle	over	the	election	of	the	Chair	and	the	subsequent	withdrawal	of	the	whip	from	the	winning	Conservative
candidate,	Julian	Lewis,	mark	a	low	point	in	an	already	deteriorating	relationship.	Lewis	is	the	second	ISC	Chair	in
succession	to	have	the	Conservative	whip	withdrawn	by	Boris	Johnson,	while	the	latest	long	delay	in	appointing	the
ISC	follows	similar	delays	after	the	2015	and	2017	general	elections.	In	the	previous	Parliament	the	ISC	wound	up
two	inquiries	early	because	the	government	refused	to	allow	the	committee	access	to	information	it	needed.
While	the	Russia	Report	has	revealed	some	evidence	of	Russian	interference	in	the	UK,	this	episode	has	also
revealed	some	worrying	examples	of	government	interference	in	the	work	of	the	ISC.	If	normal	relations	are	to	be
restored,	reforms	are	needed	to	the	way	in	which	the	ISC	is	appointed	and	operates.
Set	a	deadline	for	establishing	the	ISC	after	a	general	election
It	has	taken	longer	to	establish	the	ISC	after	the	election	than	any	other	parliamentary	committee	and	longer	than
after	any	previous	election	since	the	ISC	was	established	in	1994.	The	ISC	is	a	parliamentary	committee	and	its
members	are	appointed	by	Parliament.	However,	under	statutory	security	arrangements,	Parliament	is	asked	to
approve	a	list	of	nominations	for	membership	drawn	up	by	the	Prime	Minister	in	consultation	with	the	Leader	of	the
Opposition.	This	list	was	only	put	before	the	House	of	Commons	on	13	July	and	the	House	of	Lords	the	following
day.
At	last	week’s	press	conference,	ISC	Chair,	Julian	Lewis	stated	that:
This	committee	has	been	subjected	to	unprecedented	delay	and	dislocation	this	really	should	never	happen
again.
Unfortunately,	this	is	not	the	first	time	this	has	happened.	Lewis’s	comments	reflect	those	of	his	predecessor,
Dominic	Grieve,	following	the	five-month	delay	after	the	2017	general	election.
These	long	delays	set	a	worrying	precedent.	In	recent	months	a	succession	of	government	ministers	have
responded	to	parliamentary	questions	about	the	absence	of	the	ISC	by	claiming	that	this	is	quite	normal.	If	current
bad	practice	is	not	to	be	used	to	justify	future	delay,	a	deadline	should	be	mandated.	There	is	a	precedent	for	this	in
Canada	where	a	parliamentary	intelligence	oversight	committee,	modelled	in	no	small	part	on	the	ISC,	was	recently
established.	Canadian	legislation	states	it	must	be	set	up	within	60	days	of	Parliament	sitting	following	a	general
election.	Introducing	a	similar	deadline	to	UK	law	is	now	perhaps	the	only	way	to	ensure	that	the	work	of	the	ISC	is
not	disrupted	again.
Remove	the	Prime	Minister’s	control	over	the	timing	of	the	publication	of	ISC	reports
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Legislation	may	also	be	required	to	prevent	Prime	Ministers	from	using	the	review	process	for	ISC	reports	to
manipulate	the	timing	of	publication.	Pre-publication	reviews	are	designed	to	remove	material	which	would	be
damaging	to	national	security.	This	involves	a	process	of	negotiation	between	the	committee	and	the	intelligence
and	security	agencies.	Once	the	agencies	are	happy	that	a	report	can	be	released,	it	is	sent	to	the	Prime	Minister
for	confirmation	before	being	laid	before	Parliament	and	published.	While	the	Prime	Minister	does	not	have	the
power	to	further	alter	the	content	to	remove	material	which	might	be	politically	embarrassing,	this	process	gives	the
Prime	Minister	control	over	timing.
This	was	the	source	of	a	fractious	debate	between	the	ISC	and	the	government	prior	to	the	general	election.	The
Russia	Report	was	sent	to	the	Prime	Minister	on	17	October	but	was	not	cleared	for	publication	by	the	time
Parliament	was	dissolved	on	6	November.	The	ISC	claimed	that	it	was	standard	practice	for	the	PM	to	provide
approval	within	10	days	(something	which	the	government	disputes)	and	on	the	final	day	of	the	parliamentary
session	several	ISC	members	pressed	the	government	to	explain	what	possible	reason	the	Prime	Minister	could
have	for	withholding	approval.
It	is	important	that	ISC	reports	should	not	undermine	national	security,	so	a	process	of	review	is	clearly	necessary.
However,	if	the	intelligence	and	security	agencies	are	content	there	is	no	reason	to	add	a	further	stage.	Some
mechanism	must	now	be	put	in	place	to	prevent	Prime	Ministers	from	manipulating	the	review	process	for	political
ends.	It	may	be	sufficient	to	write	the	10-day	turnaround	for	Prime	Ministerial	confirmation	into	the	memorandum	of
understanding	between	the	ISC	and	the	government,	although	recent	governments	have	not	been	shy	of	rolling
back	on	commitments	in	this	memorandum.	A	safer	route	may	be	a	more	substantive	change	to	the	statutory
arrangements	to	state	that	in	normal	circumstances	ISC	reports	can	be	published	as	soon	as	the	intelligence	and
security	agencies	have	completed	their	review.	Provision	could	be	made	for	the	Prime	Minister	to	intervene,	but
only	if	the	ISC	and	the	agencies	cannot	agree	on	redactions	to	reports.
Improve	ministerial	engagement	with	the	ISC
One	of	the	more	startling	revelations	to	emerge	this	week	was	from	the	ISC’s	Annual	Report	for	2018–19,	which
was	published	at	the	same	time.	This	revealed	that	the	Prime	Minister	had	not	appeared	before	the	Intelligence	and
Security	Committee	since	December	2014.	Prior	to	this,	the	committee	notes,	it	had	“met	annually	with	the	Prime
Minister	to	discuss	its	work,	report	on	key	issues,	and	raise	any	concerns.”
The	notion	of	ministerial	accountability	for	the	intelligence	and	security	agencies	is	well	established.	The	Prime
Minister	has	a	statutory	duty	to	oversee	the	work	of	the	intelligence	and	security	agencies.	While	day-to-day
responsibility	for	the	agencies	lies	with	a	Secretary	of	State	(in	practice	Home	and	Foreign	secretaries),	the	heads
of	the	agencies	have	the	right	of	direct	access	to	the	Prime	Minister	and	are	required	to	report	annually	to	the	Prime
Minister	on	their	work.	Moreover,	as	current	events	have	made	clear,	the	Prime	Minister	has	considerable
responsibility	for	the	structure	and	functions	of	the	ISC	itself.
It	is	therefore	surprising	that	in	nearly	five	years	no	UK	Prime	Minister	has	found	time	to	appear	before	the	ISC.	It	is
even	more	remarkable	considering	that	two	of	the	ISC’s	inquiries,	on	the	mistreatment	of	detainees	and	lethal
drone	strikes,	were	carried	out	at	the	request	of	the	Prime	Minister.	Restoration	of	annual	meetings	between	the
Prime	Minister	and	the	ISC	will	contribute	to	more	effective	oversight	and	may	help	to	relieve	some	of	the	recent
tensions	between	them.
Reinstitute	annual	parliamentary	debates	on	the	work	of	the	ISC
It	is	also	important	that	the	committee	enjoys	a	close	relationship	with	Parliament	and	that	its	work	is	subject	to
parliamentary	scrutiny.	One	consequence	of	the	long	delay	in	appointing	the	committee	is	that	the	Russia	Report
was	published	only	days	before	Parliament’s	summer	recess.	The	government	has	not	provided	any	time	for
Parliament	to	debate	the	report	and	parliamentarians	had	to	content	themselves	with	a	short	debate	in	both	Houses
in	response	to	urgent	questions	tabled	by	Opposition	members.
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In	1998	the	Labour	government	introduced	an	annual	House	of	Commons	debate	on	the	work	of	the	Intelligence
and	Security	Committee,	followed	in	2009	by	annual	House	of	Lords	debates.	These	debates	have	fallen	into
abeyance	in	recent	years,	however.	The	last	Commons	ISC	debate	took	place	in	2010.	The	House	of	Lords	held	a
debate	on	the	work	of	the	committee	in	September	2019,	but	this	was	the	first	since	2011.	Given	that	much	of	the
ISC’s	work	takes	place	behind	closed	doors,	time	should	be	made	in	the	parliamentary	calendar	for	an	annual
debate	on	what	it	does.	Moreover,	a	Secretary	of	State	should	be	made	available	to	respond	to	these	debates,	as
was	previously	the	case,	and	not,	as	in	response	to	last	week’s	urgent	question,	a	Minister	of	State	with	no	statutory
responsibility	for	the	intelligence	agencies.
The	ISC	must	fully	transition	to	Parliament
One	of	the	more	worrying	claims	to	emerge	out	of	last	week’s	brief	House	of	Commons	debate	on	the	Russia
Report	was	Julian	Lewis’s	suggestion	that	the	government	had	sought	to	make	political	appointments	to	the
secretariat	of	the	ISC.	Although	the	source	for	this	allegation	is	not	clear,	this	is	in	keeping	with	this	government’s
increasing	reliance	on	special	advisors	including	in	the	field	of	national	security.	In	recent	months	the	role	of	Prime
Minister’s	National	Security	Advisor	was	removed	from	the	Cabinet	Secretary	and	given	to	a	political	appointee.
Reports	have	also	emerged	of	the	Prime	Minister’s	special	advisor,	Dominic	Cummings,	reviewing	Britain’s	national
security	infrastructure.
As	a	parliamentary	committee	the	ISC	should	be	immune	from	this	kind	of	interference.	However,	despite	becoming
a	parliamentary	committee	in	2013,	the	ISC	has	never	fully	transitioned	to	Parliament.	The	committee	continues	to
meet	on	government	premises	and	its	secretariat	is	drawn	from	the	Cabinet	Office	rather	than	parliamentary	staff.
The	boundaries	which	exist	between	Parliament	and	government	are	much	stronger	than	those	between	the	civil
service	and	the	executive	in	Whitehall.	Although	transition	to	Parliament	would	not	be	without	potential	drawbacks,
as	the	ISC	has	been	relatively	well-resourced	in	recent	years	and	draws	upon	expertise	from	within	the	intelligence
community,	arrangements	could	be	made	to	ensure	that	the	committee	is	still	funded	by	the	government.	The	ISC,
like	other	parliamentary	committees,	would	then	be	free	to	draw	on	outside	expertise.	In	the	interests	of	enhancing
the	credibility	of	the	ISC	and	protecting	its	independence,	the	time	has	surely	come	for	the	ISC	to	transfer	fully	to
Parliament.
Intelligence	service	accountability	is	a	necessary	feature	of	a	healthy	democracy,	and	an	independent
parliamentary	oversight	committee	is	central	to	providing	democratic	accountability.	The	ISC	has	an	essential	role
in	ensuring	the	UK’s	intelligence	agencies	are	effective	in	protecting	national	security.	It	also	ensures	that	the
intelligence	agencies	are	not	subject	to	political	pressure.	As	both	the	content	and	process	for	publishing	the	Russia
Report	suggest,	protecting	the	independence	of	Britain’s	parliamentary	institutions,	including	the	ISC,	should	now
be	a	priority	both	for	government	and	Parliament.
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